The first came from none else than Sirajuddin Haqqani, Minister of Interior Affairs, Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
“On the one hand, in order to preserve its interests, one country violates the territory of another; but Afghans have proved themselves on the battlefield, and if our forbearance is tested again, our response will be very crushing,” Haqqani told the participants of a training seminar organised for the staff of the General Directorate of Natural Disasters and Firefighting. (This is how the Tolo TV translated and front-paged his speech.)
Without naming Pakistan, Haqqani literally hurled a threat with a tone and tenor that is these days often associated with Donald Trump.
“Afghans have been tested on the battlefield… Although we don’t have long-range missiles and powerful weapons, our determination and will are strong, and we can overcome any situation and achieve victory,” he claimed in the speech released by his office.
With this, he simply resonated his ministerial spokesperson Abdul Mateen Qani, who had two days earlier spoken of “teaching Pakistan a lesson that would be an example for others too.” (Aryana TV). He also parroted the usual — though inconsequential — Durand Line narrative while regurgitating the “imaginary line” mantra.
One would assume that Qani used the TV platform to articulate an official position vis-à-vis Pakistan as the Istanbul talks seemed on the brink.
Late in the evening, Sardar Ahmad Shakeeb, the Ambassador of Afghanistan in Islamabad, also took to X with an impassioned appeal regarding Afghan refugees and the difficulties faced by them due to the border closure for nearly three weeks.
The ambassador indeed articulated a very sad reflection of the consequences that common people on both sides of the border endure because of mutually conflicting, often perhaps reconcilable, policies.
Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif contributed to the aggravation of the situation in his own way with an aggressive statement on October 29. He literally warned of an “open war” if the Istanbul talks failed, and even hinted at “Taliban regime change”. His message sounded like “peace if possible, war if forced”.
Tragic indeed that this cacophony overlooked certain ground realities:
Firstly, Afghanistan-aligned Twitter/social media handles kept planting inflammatory and derogatory disinformation or distorted views, trying to present Punjabi-Pashtoon disagreements as an existential issue in Pakistan. Propaganda machines were working overtime to deride and make light of Pakistani civil and military leaders as “American slaves”, “Punjabis” and “servants of the US”. They even ridiculed Pakistan’s nuclear programme as something “raised on charity and borrowed money.”
Secondly, Afghan officials and media repeatedly denied the presence of TTP leaders and fighters, glossing over the fact that TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud met with a Pakistani ulema delegation in Kabul in July 2022, just a month after participating in direct talks with Pakistani officials in the Afghan capital.
Thirdly, Pakistan has drawn a red line regarding the TTP, and while furiously reacting to Khawaja Asif’s statement, the Afghan side simply overlooked that this was the position of the Pakistani state, not of an individual. Even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had earlier — the first time in bilateral history — declared that “all borders will remain closed until the security situation improves.” This loaded declaration stemmed from national interests that generally don’t take compassion, brotherhood/sisterhood and religious or cultural affinity into account.
Fourthly, no doubt the Afghan mujahideen and their successor Taliban defeated the Russians and NATO forces, but Afghan friends forget the astronomical cost of this success against big powers: the resistance reduced Afghanistan to a socio-economic backyard and pushed it into an ongoing economic crisis.
Fifthly, unlike assertions by the Afghan Taliban, TTP is not Pakistan’s problem alone. It is part of a terror conglomerate that threatens the interests of other regional countries, too. It is, therefore, an outright bilateral as well as regional issue right now.
Pakistan used to deploy the same argument when deflecting the US-NATO reports on the shelters and camps of TTA in Pakistan (Quetta and Peshawar shura were the metaphors for this). “It is Afghanistan’s internal problem; the Afghan Taliban operate on their own soil. Don’t blame us,” would be the usual defence. Today, the Afghan Taliban are using the same pretext, just as FM Muttaqi did during his India visit: TTP is Pakistan’s internal problem, sort it out there. Neither of the two is entirely true.
For moving forward, the Emirate leaders will do a great favour to their own country if they act as rulers of an independent state rather than appear as a militant group.
While Pakistan has declared the TTP as an Indian proxy that enjoys immunity inside Afghanistan, Kabul has to disprove this conclusion. They also have to demonstrate through their actions that no external power drives their policies.
Afghans and Pakistanis alike should realise that bravado may impress for a moment, but it seldom endures.
As far as Pakistan is concerned, four border closures this year have kept compounding resulting hardships of people at large, commuters, farmers, traders and daily wage workers. Border closures not only destroy perishable products but also disrupt supply chains, directly impacting the production and employment cycle. Politics must not obscure care for humanitarian needs.