A central misconception clouds the public conversation, particularly in Pakistan. Many assume the Accords reflect a theological reconciliation among the Abrahamic faiths, a symbolic gesture toward Muslim-Jewish harmony. This is a misunderstanding of both purpose and intent. Global interfaith initiatives – whether in Europe, Southeast Asia or the Gulf – aim to nurture social coexistence, reduce religious prejudice and build community-level harmony. They are ethical projects, rooted in dialogue and civic cooperation.
The Abraham Accords are something entirely different. They are not about religious coexistence but about strategic realignment. Their purpose is not spiritual but geopolitical: integrate Israel into a regional security framework, reassure Washington that its allies can collectively manage Iran, and connect Gulf capital with Israeli technological and intelligence capacities. In other words, the Accords function as a security pact wrapped in scriptural language.
For Israel, the arrangement offers significant benefits. It gains access to Gulf markets, enjoys political legitimacy previously unimaginable and strengthens a regional coalition against Iranian influence. For the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco, the calculation is similarly pragmatic: secure Western support, diversify economies through partnerships with Israel and reduce dependence on US defence guarantees in an era of American strategic retrenchment.
Yet the Accords rest on a fundamental contradiction. They attempt to redraw the region’s architecture while bypassing the question of Palestine, treating it as an inconvenient moral obstacle rather than the central axis of Middle Eastern politics. Arab governments may wish to move forward, but their societies remain overwhelmingly committed to Palestinian dignity and statehood.
This is the primary reason why Saudi Arabia, despite extensive backchannel engagement, cannot formalise ties with Israel. Riyadh’s religious legitimacy is intertwined with its moral posture on Palestine. Any move toward full normalisation without tangible progress on Palestinian statehood would risk deep political unrest across the Muslim world. For Pakistan, the constraints are equally binding. A state built partly on the idea of Muslim solidarity cannot abruptly reverse its historic position under external pressure.
The long-term outlook is therefore mixed. If the Accords deepen, the Middle East may witness a formalised security bloc linking Israel with several Sunni governments – complete with integrated defence systems, intelligence-sharing and joint economic ventures. But without addressing the Palestinian question, such an order will remain brittle. Economic opportunities may multiply, but political legitimacy will lag behind. Normalisation without justice is not peace; it is a transactional arrangement masking an unresolved conflict.
This raises the central question: are the Abraham Accords a genuine beginning or merely a quick fix? Their promoters see them as a pathway to stability, but their foundations are incomplete. Real peace in the Middle East cannot be engineered through shortcuts. It requires confronting the question the Accords attempt to avoid. Until Palestinians obtain dignity, sovereignty and genuine political inclusion, no diplomatic choreography – however ambitious – will deliver a stable or just regional order.
In their current form, the Abraham Accords offer a glimpse of possibility, but not a resolution. Whether they evolve into a sustainable architecture or fade as another experiment in geopolitical optimism will depend on whether the region is ready to address the issue that has defined the Middle East for generations.