The world has a long history of how politics took nations to war and how millions of people died because the politician or the military leader failed to get their big ideas right. The biggest lesson of history is that we don’t learn from history, and while over the years military warfare has considerably evolved, what hasn’t evolved is our consistent disregard to learn from history. When World War Two ended at the enormous cost of over 60 million deaths, the world seemed determined to put an end to the military madness of fighting wars, and the creation of the UN seemed to be the one phenomenal event which the world hoped would provide a global platform to create global peace and stability and put a lid on the gutter of warmongers. That didn’t happen. What I want to write about is the short story of three nations and their leadership, in how they got their big ideas wrong and how they all contributed to the evolution of warfare right in the aftermath of World War Two. The irony is not how they got their big ideas wrong; the irony is that we still haven’t learnt from the mistakes they made. The three nations are China, the United States and France.
From 1937 to 1945, there were two wars going on simultaneously in China – the national war against imperialist Japan and the communist civil war. The wreckage of the Chang Kai-Shek’s regime that ruled China was built on three strategic realities: official corruption, mass hunger and brutal security state. Chang’s big idea of ruling China was built on a wrong foundation. Mao’s communists defeated Chang’s nationalists because Mao got his big ideas right. Militarily, he avoided confrontation and resorted to guerrilla warfare, but politically, his ideas resonated with the Chinese population, 90% of whom were peasants. He executed a ruthless policy of land distribution, and for a Chinese landlord, ownership of land more than two-thirds of an acre meant a death sentence. The Chinese civil war cost 6 million lives, and the war that China fought against imperialist Japan cost between 15 and 20 million lives. How warfare had evolved could be ascertained in how a smaller force, a guerrilla force, could fight against a government that is bigger and backed by foreign power (the United States).
The second story is that of the United States in how it fought the Korean War. In June 1950, North Korea undertook a surprise attack against South Korea. Surprise attacks have their drawbacks – they draw the enemy into a more active response; leave no doubt in who the actual aggressor is; and are not only stopped but also punished. The misfortunes of some of the surprise attacks can be witnessed through the history of military warfare – Hitler’s attack on Russia, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour, Arab’s surprise attack during the Yom Kippur War, Argentina’s attack on the Falklands, Iraq’s war on Kuwait and 9/11 bombing in the United States. All attacks came as surprise, but all ended up getting punished in the end.
The big idea in the Korean War came from President Truman, who said, “We will have a dozen Koreas if we don’t take a firm stand.” The Korean War offered two evolutions in military warfare. It was the first war being fought under the UN mandate, as the Soviet Union had boycotted the UN on the pretext that Nationalist China was given a UN Security Council seat against communist China. The second evolution of the warfare was that it became the first limited war that was fought under the concept of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction). General MacArthur was appointed the Supreme Commander of forces in Korea. It was Gen MacArthur who got his big idea wrong. In October 1950, President Truman travelled over 14,000 miles to meet his Supreme Commander. He asked Gen MacArthur if there was any chance that China or Russia might assist North Korea directly. To this the General replied, “Very little.” But that was his miscalculation.
The Chinese crossed Yalu River and routed South Korea’s 6th Division. North Korea took Pyongyang, and both armies ended up stalemating at the 38th Parallel. Gen MacArthur was relieved of his command in April 1951 when his letter to the American President, critical of the President’s concept of understanding limited warfare, became public. MacArthur’s other big idea that went wrong was his involvement in American domestic politics. General Petraeus is of the view that although Clausewitz suggests that war is politics by other means, generals ought to confine themselves to the politics of the place where they are fighting rather than back home.
The third and last story of leadership’s big ideas going wrong, and the evolution of warfare, is that of France. As soon as Japan was defeated in World War Two, Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese leader, proclaimed independence from French colonists. “For eighty years,” he said, “you have oppressed our fatherland and our fellow citizens.” In Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, around 75,000 French died. Guerrilla warfare had defeated France in the Indo-China jungles. But the big idea going wrong for France was in Algeria, from where it refused as a colonist to withdraw with dignity and honour. France had accepted the independence of Morocco and Tunisia in 1956 yet it was not willing to grant the Algerians the same.
France resorted to torture in the war, and the big idea that went wrong was for it not to realise how quickly the support of its actions would evaporate not only in Algeria but also in France. Charles De Gaulle was brought back in power to restore the situation who in 1959 declared that the Algerian problem would be resolved by “the free choice of Algerians themselves”. Torture as an instrument of state repression was practised by France, but failed to inspire as an effective means of evolution in warfare.