For many, the controversy transcends the fate of one individual judge. It raises serious constitutional questions regarding judicial independence, institutional overreach and adherence to the procedure explicitly laid down in the Constitution of Pakistan for the removal of judges.
Critics of the judgment draw an unsettling parallel with a dark episode in Pakistan’s judicial history: the treatment meted out to Justice Ghulam Safdar Shah during the martial law regime of General Zia-ul-Haq. Justice Shah had dissented from the majority judgment that upheld the death sentence of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The consequence was swift and punitive. His matriculation certificate was declared bogus, his credibility questioned and his position rendered untenable, forcing him into exile. The signal was clear — judicial independence would not be tolerated where it conflicted with power.
In a disturbingly similar fashion, the LLB degree of Justice Jahangiri has now been declared bogus, leading to his removal. While the political contexts differ — one under martial law and the other within a constitutional framework — the method and its implications are uncomfortably familiar. The use of academic credentials as a tool to silence inconvenient judges undermines institutional credibility and erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
What makes the present case particularly troubling is the novel procedural route adopted. A writ of quo warranto was entertained by the Islamabad High Court itself, questioning the very eligibility of one of its own sitting judges. The same court of which Justice Jahangiri was a member assumed jurisdiction and proceeded to decide a matter that ultimately resulted in his removal from office.
This development raises a fundamental constitutional question: does a High Court — or even the Supreme Court — have jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the removal of a judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court? Or has the Constitution provided a distinct and exclusive mechanism for such an extraordinary measure?
The answer lies squarely within the Constitution itself. Article 209 of the Constitution of Pakistan provides a comprehensive and exclusive procedure for the removal of judges of the High Courts and the Supreme Court. Under this Article, a judge may only be removed following an inquiry conducted by the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), on grounds such as misconduct, incapacity, or inefficiency.
Clause (7) of Article 209 is unequivocal: “A Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court shall not be removed from office except as provided by this Article.” This provision leaves no room for alternative interpretations or parallel mechanisms.
The rationale behind this constitutional safeguard is self-evident. Judicial independence cannot survive if judges are exposed to the constant threat of removal through ordinary judicial proceedings. The framers of the Constitution deliberately insulated judges from such pressures by vesting removal powers exclusively in the SJC — a body designed to ensure due process, confidentiality and institutional balance.
Seen from this constitutional perspective, the Islamabad High Court’s judgment appears to deviate from the path clearly laid down by the Constitution and reinforced by precedent. By entertaining a writ of quo warranto, the High Court effectively bypassed the SJC, thereby rendering Article 209 redundant in practice. If such an approach is validated, the constitutional firewall protecting judicial independence stands severely weakened.
It may be argued that eligibility to hold office is distinct from misconduct while in office. However, once a judge has been appointed through the constitutionally prescribed process, any inquiry that results in his removal — regardless of how it is labeled — must conform to Article 209. What cannot be done directly under the Constitution cannot be achieved indirectly through judicial ingenuity.
Allowing High Courts to remove their own judges through writ jurisdiction sets a dangerous precedent. Tomorrow, any judge who renders an inconvenient judgment may find his credentials scrutinised, his past excavated, and his tenure destabilised through proceedings initiated within his own court.
The intent and purpose of Article 209 were precisely to prevent such scenarios. Judicial accountability was never meant to become a tool for judicial intimidation. Accountability and independence are not competing values; they are complementary — but only when exercised within constitutional limits.
While accountability is essential for institutional integrity, it must operate strictly within the framework provided by the Constitution. Expediency cannot trump constitutional command. A judiciary that compromises its own constitutional safeguards risks undermining the rule of law it is sworn to uphold.
A plain reading of Article 209 makes it abundantly clear that the Islamabad High Court lacked jurisdiction in this matter and could not lawfully bypass SJC. The issue, therefore, is not merely about one judge or one degree. It is about whether Pakistan’s constitutional promise of an independent judiciary remains intact – or whether it is being quietly diluted through judicial shortcuts.