The establishment of a Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) sits at the centre of these concerns. By design, the FCC’s decisions bind all other courts, including the Supreme Court, while the FCC itself remains unbound by the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. This is a rupture. Constitutional law depends on continuity and precedent. Severing that continuity invites legal uncertainty and inconsistent interpretation of the law — hardly the hallmarks of a functioning justice system. The appointment of its chief justice and judges by the President, acting on the advice of the PM and bypassing the Judicial Commission of Pakistan, strikes directly at the principle of separation of powers. Judicial independence is as much about perception as it is about practice. When appointments appear politically managed, public confidence in impartial adjudication inevitably suffers.
The amendment further allows the transfer of high court judges without their consent. Such authority, however rationalised, carries an unmistakable chilling effect. A judiciary that operates under the shadow of involuntary transfers cannot discharge its role as an effective check on executive excess.
Pakistan’s constitutional history offers sobering lessons. Each time judicial independence has been compromised in the name of expediency, it has been the citizen who has paid the price. Amnesty International’s call for an urgent review of the 27th amendment is a reminder that constitutional legitimacy flows from restraint, not concentration of power. If judicial freedom is curtailed, the rule of law becomes conditional — and a conditional rule of law is no rule at all.