Five failures in five years: ISRO’s launch crisis a national liability

India’s space programme has entered an uncomfortable phase where failure is no longer an exception but a recurring feature. The crash of PSLV-C62 in January 2026, which destroyed the EOS-N1 (Anvesha) Earth-observation satellite and 15 co-passenger spacecraft minutes after lift-off from Sriharikota, was not simply another technical mishap in an inherently risky domain. It was the fifth failure of the ISRO (Indian Space Research Organisation) mission since 2021, the second involving the PSLV within eight months, and the third major setback in a single year. At that point, the question is no longer whether rockets fail; it is why they are failing so often, and at what cost.

For decades, ISRO’s credibility rested occasional ambition, consistent reliability. That balance has broken down. Between 1993 and 2017, PSLV — the backbone of India’s launch capability — failed only twice. Since 2021, however, ISRO has recorded five failed or partially failed orbital missions across three launch vehicles. Three of those failures occurred between January 2025 and January 2026 alone. This clustering is unprecedented in ISRO’s operational history and points to a systemic problem rather than random bad luck.

The January 2026 failure of PSLV-C62 was particularly damaging because of what it carried. EOS-N1 (Anvesha) was an Earth-observation satellite meant for high-resolution imaging. Such satellites are used for border monitoring, terrain analysis, disaster response, infrastructure mapping and strategic surveillance. In practical terms, they help governments see what is happening on the ground in near real time. Losing one is not merely a scientific setback; it weakens state capacity. That loss came on top of the PSLV-C61 failure in May 2025, which prevented another Earth-observation satellite, EOS-09, from reaching its intended orbit. In both cases, ISRO cited a drop in combustion chamber pressure in the third stage of the rocket — a troubling repetition.

The problem does not stop with PSLV. In January 2025, the GSLV-F15 mission technically succeeded in placing the NVS-02 satellite into transfer orbit, but the satellite failed to fire its engine due to a valve malfunction, rendering it useless. In August 2021, GSLV-F10 failed outright due to a cryogenic stage leak, destroying the EOS-03 satellite. In 2022, ISRO’s much-touted Small Satellite Launch Vehicle suffered a partial failure on its inaugural flight when a sensor issue placed satellites into an unstable orbit, causing them to burn up. Different rockets, different subsystems, same outcome.

Taken together, these failures have had a measurable financial impact. Conservative estimates put the cumulative cost of five failed missions at between ?2,200 and ?2,800 crore, roughly $265–335 million. That figure represents around 15% of ISRO’s annual budget for 2025–26. These are not sunk research expenses; they are destroyed operational assets funded by public money. PSLV-C61 alone cost an estimated ?450–500 crore, while PSLV-C62 and its payloads cost as much as ?750 crore.

The commercial fallout has been just as severe. At its peak in 2017, India controlled roughly 35% of the global small-satellite launch market. Today, that share has reportedly fallen to near zero. International clients have little tolerance for inconsistency, and recent failures have driven them toward more reliable providers. Foreign rideshare launches that once generated over $100 million in revenue have dried up. Contracts involving satellites from Nepal, Brazil and Europe have been cancelled or postponed, with projected revenue losses of $50–70 million in the current financial year.

There is also a strategic dimension that cannot be ignored. Many of the satellites lost since 2021 were tied to national security functions, including Earth observation and navigation. Disruptions to the NavIC constellation weaken India’s ability to rely on its own positioning system. Delays in deploying surveillance satellites reduce real-time intelligence capabilities at a time of persistent regional tensions. These are not abstract risks; they affect how states perceive India’s readiness and resilience.

Critically, this deterioration coincides with a period of aggressive policy overreach. The government’s push to commercialise and privatise the space sector – through entities like NewSpace India Limited and the rapid onboarding of private launch startups – has placed additional pressure on ISRO’s core launch systems. Commercial ambition has not been matched by institutional breathing space. Launch schedules have tightened, and failure tolerance has shrunk, even as systems show signs of stress. Instead of stabilising the PSLV before expanding its role, the vehicle has been asked to carry both strategic payloads and commercial expectations.

Regional comparisons further underline the issue. China, India’s principal competitor in space, experiences failures too, but compensates through scale, redundancy and rapid recovery. Lost satellites are quickly replaced. Pakistan, though far behind technologically, has steadily expanded its space capabilities through partnerships, particularly with China, without overpromising or overselling its achievements. India, by contrast, has combined ambitious rhetoric with declining consistency – a dangerous mix in a domain where credibility compounds over time.

The most unsettling issue is that some of the technology involved overlaps with other important national systems. The PSLV’s third stage relies on solid-fuel propulsion that is also used elsewhere in India’s strategic programmes. When the same component fails repeatedly, it naturally raises concerns about quality checks and manufacturing standards beyond just one rocket. Even if these programmes are officially separate, repeated technical problems can affect confidence. In matters of national capability, how reliable a system appears is almost as important as how it actually performs.

ISRO still possesses deep technical expertise and a legacy of problem-solving. What it lacks at this moment is institutional calm. Historically, ISRO responded to failure by slowing down. Today, the response appears to be to reassure and proceed. That shift may prove costly. Space programmes recover not through momentum, but through correction.

Five failures in five years should force a reassessment – not just of engineering fixes, but of policy direction. If reliability continues to erode, India risks losing more than satellites. It risks losing the one asset that once set its space programme apart: trust.