The real issue, however, is not about scoring diplomatic points. The core question is whether denial, blame and isolated military actions can address what is clearly a cross-border and structural security problem.
According to the report, no UNSC member state accepted Kabul’s assertion that there are no terrorist groups in Afghanistan. In international diplomacy, when multiple countries quietly reject a claim, it reflects a shared assessment. The report further notes that the TTP has gained greater operational freedom in Afghanistan, which has contributed to increased attacks inside Pakistan. It also highlights that Al-Qaeda has provided training and advisory support to the TTP.
For Pakistan, this confirms longstanding concerns. Islamabad has repeatedly argued that TTP militants use Afghan territory as a sanctuary. Since the Taliban returned to power in Kabul in August 2021, Pakistan has witnessed a noticeable rise in militant violence. However, while Pakistan’s concerns appear validated by the UN findings, the issue is more complex than a simple accusation against Kabul.
To understand the present situation, one must look at history. Afghanistan has been in continuous conflict for over four decades – from the Soviet invasion in 1979 to civil war, the first Taliban regime, the US-led intervention after 9/11, and the sudden withdrawal of American and NATO forces in 2021. Each phase of war has weakened state institutions and strengthened non-state actors.
When the Taliban regained power in 2021, thousands of prisoners were released from Afghan jails, including experienced fighters. Many of them rejoined militant groups. The power vacuum created by the sudden collapse of the previous Afghan government made it easier for groups like TTP to reorganise. This does not automatically mean that the Afghan Taliban formally support them. But it does mean that controlling them is far more difficult than issuing official denials.
The UN report also raises concerns about Al-Qaeda’s continued presence in Afghanistan. Reports that elements of Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) may be based in Kabul are alarming. The world remembers that Afghanistan under Taliban rule in the 1990s became a sanctuary for Al-Qaeda, eventually leading to the 9/11 attacks. The fear now is not that history will repeat itself in the exact same way, but that Afghanistan could once again become a permissive environment for transnational militancy.
Another troubling factor is weaponry. The report notes that American and NATO military equipment left behind in Afghanistan has enhanced the capabilities of militant groups. The TTP’s reported use of modern weapons, night-vision devices and drones has increased the lethality of its attacks. This changes the nature of the threat. Militancy is no longer limited to crude tactics; it is becoming more sophisticated.
At the same time, ISKP remains active, particularly in northern Afghanistan and near the Pakistan border. ISKP is hostile not only to Pakistan but also to the Afghan Taliban themselves. Its attacks inside Afghanistan demonstrate that the Taliban do not exercise complete control over the country’s security environment. This complicates the narrative that the Taliban can simply eliminate all militant groups at will.
This brings us to a logical argument. If militant groups are operating in Afghanistan, the responsibility of the Afghan authorities is clear: they must prevent their territory from being used against other countries. This is a basic principle of international law and state sovereignty. Seeking international recognition while failing to address cross-border militancy weakens Kabul’s credibility.
But it is equally logical to recognise that Afghanistan’s capacity to enforce control is limited. The country is facing economic collapse, humanitarian crisis and diplomatic isolation. Sanctions and frozen assets have further restricted the government’s ability to build strong institutions. A weak state struggles to impose order, especially in remote and mountainous regions where militant networks have deep roots.
Pakistan, too, must adopt a balanced view. While cross-border sanctuaries may exist, militancy inside Pakistan cannot be explained solely by events in Afghanistan. Extremism also feeds on internal political instability, weak governance and economic hardship. A purely military solution, without political and social reform, has historically failed to bring lasting peace. Pakistan’s own past operations demonstrate that military success must be followed by sustained governance and development.
Therefore, blaming Kabul alone will not resolve the crisis. Nor will denial from the Afghan side. A more practical approach would involve structured dialogue, intelligence sharing and border management mechanisms. Pakistan and Afghanistan share a long and porous border, with deep tribal and family ties across it. Completely sealing it is unrealistic. Cooperation is more effective than confrontation.
Regional powers also have a stake in stability. China worries about extremist spillover into Xinjiang. Central Asian states fear infiltration. Iran closely monitors militant movements along its borders. Even Russia remains concerned about the revival of transnational jihadist networks. A coordinated regional framework, possibly under UN facilitation, may offer more realistic solutions than bilateral accusations.
In the final analysis, the UN report is not a verdict but a warning. It confirms that militant groups remain active in Afghanistan and that their actions affect Pakistan. It also indirectly highlights the fragile state of Afghan governance. The logical conclusion is clear: security in this region is shared and interconnected.
If Kabul continues to rely on denial, it risks further diplomatic isolation. If Islamabad depends only on military pressure without addressing internal vulnerabilities, it risks prolonging the cycle of violence.
The choice is between managing a shared problem through cooperation or allowing mistrust to deepen. The UN has laid out the facts. What remains is whether regional actors are willing to respond with realism, responsibility and a long-term vision for peace.