While enough has been said about genesis of the problems of Baloch Balochistan, following aspects, as responsible problem areas, are and should be undoubtedly under spotlight. First, the criminal lack of governance especially in the less egalitarian Baloch areas, leaving executive, judicial, administrative and even legislative (riwaj) powers in the hands of recalcitrant and predatory Sardars, who exploit their people to maximise their own political and financial advantage. The Sandeman-established Sardari system worked well in 19th and even 20th Century; it has no place in modern state structure. Reinvigorating the system, tested and tried since 1947, is reinforcing the failure. Sardar was and is part of the problem.
Two, the fact that insurgency is confined to the Baloch Belt, and that too in the former Kalat State, and its smaller vassals states like Sarawan and Jhalawan, also the hotbeds of anti-Pakistan insurgency in the 1970s, speaks something about the ‘credibility’ of the insurgency itself. Why are the entire Baloch and Brahui lands (Makran, Lasbella, ‘entire’ Kharan, etc) and the Pashtun North not infected? Why is the Pashtun Belt not inspired by Baloch sense of ‘deprivation’ and grievances? Because apparently, the Pashtuns are more egalitarian, economically enterprising and have no blackmailing elite like the Baloch Sardars.
Moreover, Lasbella State under the Jam family is integrated with Sindh and has innate economic dynamism. Missteps by Pakistan aside, the affected Baloch Belt is actively exploited by local Sardars, politicians and foreign elements, to incite trouble mainly under presumed poverty, lack of integration and suboptimal economic potential, except its untapped minerals. And exploiting minerals needs resources and peace as preconditions, both of which are missing.
Three, conceptually speaking, the cited Baloch lands badly need alternative eldership to address their economic and political grievances, staying within the Constitution of Pakistan. Secession, due to the ‘drummed-up’ sense of deprivation and Sardar-inflicted grievances, is not the way to go. And that is why negotiations are and would be a non-starter. For the political process to take root, enabling conditions are to be met first; peace and security being the foremost, besides an avowed willingness to negotiate within the bounds of the Constitution, not outside it. No state has ever negotiated with the secessionist movements anywhere. Malaysia, Sri Lanka and the UK are cases in point.
Four, since Sardar is part of the problem and a tested and tried bad choice; and the secessionist youth seems unwilling to negotiate, other than a violent parting of ways with Pakistan, what are Islamabad’s options? Detailed antidote was prescribed in my Op-ed last week titled ‘Insurgency in Baloch areas of Balochistan — way forward’. The three-step approach besides the long-term ‘surges’ identified in the cited article, would be: a) fight the militants to submission now, and in the near future; b) govern the cleared areas through civilian surge for the foreseeable future, ensuring development and progress; and c) create an alternative Baloch leadership from within the cited areas, in the long-term. These steps could be undertaken concurrently, situation permitting.
Five, the obtaining environment has following understandable imperatives:
A) The insurgency, as cited, is localised, but has the potential for conflagration. A handful of militants can impose their will on silent majority when the State is seen abdicating, unwilling or unable to take hard steps. People become fence-sitters. Swat in recent past is a case in point.
B) The writ of the State of Pakistan is not withering away in the entire Balochistan, as touted by armchair analysts from Punjab et al. Because Balochistan is not a monolith.
C) Sardar is part of the problem, due to the cited reasons of their traditional blackmailing of the Federal Government for monetary gains, corruption and being squarely responsible for not passing the benefits of the many ‘Balochistan Packages’ to the people in their areas.
D) There is no alternative, as of now, to Sardar’s (slipping) stranglehold in Kalat, Sarawan and Jhalawan, in particular. But the fact that insurgency is in the hands of educated Baloch youth carries a silver-lining around the dark cloud. We would come to this point later.
E) Political solution ONLY, as touted by some analyst will not work till the time kinetics create an environment of normalcy and peace. And political process will succeed only under alternative Baloch leadership. At this point, foreign intelligence, cited last week, has heavily invested in the insurgency.
Six, alternative leadership — being the devil’s advocate — will rise and come from the remnants of the same secessionist youth overtime, when they are mainstreamed, which ultimately, they will. The sociology of Baloch Movement suggests frustration among youth due to lack of opportunities and representation, for which most of them quietly hold their Sardars also responsible. However, their reaction is directed against a more resourced Pakistan, given the promise of representation and the accompanying riches in freedom from Punjabi Pakistan. Hence the dream of Baloch Singapore, surviving on mineral resources and sea-borne riches along Makran coast.
Seven, following on from the above, Federation is in for a long-haul, entailing fighting insurgency, interim governance through bureaucracy, nurturing alternative Baloch leadership and stabilising presence in other parts of Balochistan and in K-P. Islamabad needs to have a better understanding of Balochistan’s dynamics. Creating a pool of officers like ‘Political Officers’ for erstwhile FATA would be a good start. Intelligence agencies are just to collect, collate and disseminate information, with no role in policy formulation and governance, whatsoever, once the immediate phase of ‘Intelligence Surge’ and COIN is over.
And lastly, appeasement i.e. empowering Sardars again will not work, now or in future. The State of Pakistan should deal with stakeholders from a position of strength, not weakness. There should be no half-hearted measures; and no one step forward and two steps back. Policy consistency, will to prevail, engagement, and multi-pronged COIN are some answers.
Holding the nerve is existential!