Iran’s has expansive ballistic and cruise missile capability. But first difference between both. A ballistic missile is a small rocket, whose trajectory goes above atmosphere, and it speeds through gravity while descending. A cruise missile is an earth-hugging small plane, travelling within atmosphere, and is continuously powered. In ballistic missiles, Iran has short range (different variants of Zulfiqar, Shahab, and Fatah series), and medium range combinations. In medium range, Iran’s ballistic inventory includes Emad (1,700 km), Khorramshahr (1,000-2,000 km) or solid fuel Sejil and Shahab Series (up to 2,400 km) etc. They effectively cover the entire Israel, Gulf and Saudi Arabia from Iran proper, or from forward deployments in Yemen and Iraq.
Fatah series of hypersonic ballistic missiles (Fatah-1 ranging 1,400 km and Fatah-2, 1,500 km) developed by the Pasdaran/IRGC can travel at speeds between Mach 13 to 15 and evade advanced AD systems. At this speed, they hit Israel within 400 seconds, whereas Israeli AD response (detection, decision-making, launch and people going to bunkers) generally takes 15-20 minutes. Fatah-1 is a maneuvering missile whereas Fatah-2 comprises a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) for enhanced maneuverability and unpredictability. These hypersonic missiles, of which roughly 50% survive out of approximately 3,000, remain the biggest US-Israel worry. Fatah and Khorramshahr missiles and Shahed drones carry significant payload, loiter longer and undertake strike, surveillance and electronic warfare roles.
In cruise missile category, Iran fields Soumar Series, Paveh, Ya-Ali, and Quds Series. The kamikaze HESA Shahed-136, as cornerstone of Iran’s drone inventory, ranges up to 2,000-2,500 km allowing deep strikes. These are slow moving and low, hence difficult for radar detection. They fly in large, coordinated swarms to saturate Israeli AD responses. Their Chinese Baidu-III satellite navigation system can reportedly employ GPS signal as a weapon to confuse the enemy AD. Kuwaiti AD shooting three friendly American F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jets on March 1 can be a case in point. Comparatively inexpensive drone swarms cause Israeli AD to fire multiple expensive missiles, causing ammunition wastage, and clear the way for ballistic and cruise missiles in the follow-up waves. Every inexpensive Iranian drone, besides systematically causing more expensive anti-drone responses, triggers psychological trauma even if it is intercepted without hitting the intended target. Additionally, in ‘missile economics’, Iran’s inexpensive missiles costing around $0.15 million apiece, compared to IDF’s limited array of very expensive missiles, $2-3 million apiece, puts additional economic stress on the Coalition.
Iranian doctrine of deterrence involves ‘denial and attrition’ – direct and indirect. Indirect deterrence is manifested through its 3H (Hamas, Houthi and Hezbollah) proxies. An eminent US scholar of Iranian descent, Prof Vali Nasr in his recent book, Iran’s Grand Strategy: A Political History, posits that Iran’s contemporary strategic vision is driven more by Iran’s ‘national security rooted in regional rivalries’ expressed in religious motifs, rather than revolutionary fervour. And that eight years’ war against Iraq in 1980s, besides societal changes, enhanced Tehran’s pain threshold and suffering endurance. That war also vastly empowered Pasdaran/IRGC politically and economically. IRGC’s belief to rebound from setbacks has resulted in self-sufficiency. And Tehran’s strategic doctrine of ‘forward defence’ adopted in 2003 created proxies to neutralise threats before they reached the mainland. The late General Qasem Soleimani used IRGC’s Quds and Jerusalem Brigades to deadly effect.
Prof Nasr cites limited civil liberties, comparative oppression, economic hardships and lack of opportunity making societal divisions, and discernable but slow unravelling of the regime. Iran’s geostrategic overstretch, not backed by its economic power, has enabled Israel to emerge as a resurgent and dominant ME power. Prof Nasr thinks Ayatullah Mojtaba ‘might’ perpetuate the ‘forward defence’ doctrine more aggressively, with wide-ranging consequences.
Iran’s unusual military architecture comprises a Western-style Army (Artesh-e-Jomhouri-ye Islamiye-Iran, or Artesh) which remains politically suspect being the legacy of Shah; and a revolutionary force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps or Sepah-e-Pasdaran-e-Enqelab-e-Islami. Established in 1979 by Khomeini, IRGC is an ideologically reliable mainstay of Iran’s Military System, acting as counterweight to Artesh. Pasdaran assimilated multitude of armed groups and is employed to purge political opposition and ensure ideological adherence to the Revolution, especially the political role by Supreme Leader — the Velayat-e Faqih — who oversights the entire Military System. Basij Militia, set up by Khomeini, constitutes volunteer regime loyalists used to quell street dissent.
Pasdaran command Ground, Naval and Aerospace Forces, Quds Force (roughly over 100,000), Basij Militia (around 90,000) alongside cyber, intelligence, counterintelligence and other security forces. Pasdaran constitutionally remain committed to exporting the Revolution. Loyalty of Pasdaran and professionalism of Artesh affects operational interaction. Pasdaran’s aggressive loyalty wins greater prestige, direct access to senior leadership and superior budget. They exercise immense commercial clout through their conglomerate, the Khatam-al-Anbiya, which emerged during re-building after the Iraq war.
For territorial defence, Iran’s deterrence-based doctrine stresses raising invaders’ risks and costs instead of reducing its own. Use of proxies affords Iran operational flexibility by retaliating against an adversary at a time and place of its choosing. Proxy partners also extend Tehran’s psychological warfare, propaganda and perception management potential. Iran deploys sizeable, albeit localised, tools to disrupt, destroy and hack adversaries’ networks and is improving to conduct more lethal and lasting cyber-attacks.
IRGC’s is reliant upon Quds Force (Jerusalem Force or Niru-ye-Quds) and has sections devoted to countries and regions like Ramazan Corps for Iraq; Levant Corps for Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel, Rasulullah Corps for Arabian Peninsula and Ansar Corps for Afghanistan etc. Pasdaran provide support to any group deemed part of Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’. Iran also has the advantage of force multipliers, like a ‘just cause’ and ‘apparently’ more will-to-fight.
Tehran’s current ‘licensing’ of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and its drone/missile strikes in the Arab world has rocked the energy markets and Gulf’s economics and peace. The sense gaining traction among Coalition is to reopen Hormuz and restore Arab Gulf’s confidence in the US security architecture. The Israel-US inability to attain their cited war objectives leaves open the ‘probability’ of a ground offensive against Tehran.
More next week…