Five years later, those promises stand broken. Afghan Taliban have gained diplomatic legitimacy, political concessions and substantial financial benefits from international community, yet they have failed to honour core terms of the agreement in Doha and subsequent commitments, including 2024 Trilateral Accord with Pakistan and the UAE.
First pillar of Doha Accord required Taliban to engage in dialogue with other Afghan factions to form an inclusive government. To build confidence, 5,000 Taliban prisoners were released on condition they renounce militancy and back a political settlement. Instead, almost all of them returned to combat. Rather than engaging with the Ashraf Ghani administration in an intra-Afghan dialogue, Taliban intensified their insurgency and seized Kabul in August 2021, just a year and a half after Doha Accord and imposed a government dominated by their militant leadership.
That government remains deeply exclusionary. Afghanistan’s 14 recognised ethnic groups, including Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Uzbek 9%, Hazara 8%, are barely represented in a 49-member cabinet. The country’s population is roughly 89% Sunni and 11% Shia, yet Taliban have entirely excluded Shia and other sectarian minorities from governance.
According to UN and regional assessments, Pashtuns hold nearly 90% of all key positions, while Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras combined occupy less than 10%. Only two Tajiks, two Uzbeks, two Baloch and one Nuristani hold minor portfolios, while all key ministries are monopolised by Pashtuns. The entire government comprises figures linked to Tehreek-e-Taliban Afghanistan (TTA). Kandahar Shura, which shapes ideological and political direction, is composed exclusively of Pashtuns. Moreover, women have been almost entirely erased from public life, barred from education and employment. These regressive policies defy the spirit of inclusivity promised in Doha Accord.
The second pillar, prohibiting Afghan territory from being used to threaten other states, has also been willfully violated. The killing of Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul in August 2022, a year after the Taliban’s return, exposed their duplicity. Likewise, former CIA Al-Qaeda case officer Sarah Adams has publicly confirmed that Saif al-Adl and Hamza bin Laden live in Kabul under Taliban protection. Similarly, the 35th and 36th UN Monitoring Team reports confirmed Al-Qaeda’s reorganisation in Afghanistan and documented Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) providing safe houses, movement passes and weapon permits to TTP and Al-Qaeda operatives.
The reports further revealed that TTP chief Noor Wali Mehsud receives a monthly stipend of $43,000 from the Taliban intelligence apparatus to sustain TTP fighters and maintain sanctuaries in Afghanistan. The 66th SIGAR Report (January 2025) confirmed 6,000 to 6,500 TTP fighters and senior Al-Qaeda leaders operating from Afghanistan while the 68th Report (July 2025) found Taliban providing safe havens to ISIS-Khorasan, TTP and Al-Qaeda alike.
Inside Afghanistan, repression has intensified. UNAMA’s 2024 Media Freedom Report paints a bleak picture, documenting 256 arbitrary arrests of journalists, 130 cases of torture and 75 incidents of threats and intimidation. These are not isolated incidents but clear evidence of a deliberate campaign to silence dissent and control national narrative, a regime sustained by fear rather than representation.
Regionally, Taliban duplicity extends to Pakistan and the UAE. Under 2024 Trilateral Agreement, the Taliban regime pledged to relocate TTP militants away from Pakistan’s border and prevent cross-border attacks. They accepted funds from the UAE but relocated only a few hundred fighters, failed to share verification lists and allowed TTP elements to continue operating freely.
Despite receiving nearly $80 million per month from the US and considerable aid from UN agencies, Taliban have not changed course. Reports indicate that large portions of donor assistance are being diverted to TTP-linked networks under guise of refugee and humanitarian aid.
The costs for Pakistan have been severe. Between April and September 2025, Pakistani security forces neutralised 135 Afghan nationals engaged in terrorism across Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. In total, 267 Afghan nationals have been identified among those killed in counterterrorism operations so far. In major engagements such as the April 25-26 clashes in North Waziristan and the August 7 operation in Zhob, dozens of Afghan terrorists were eliminated, after which the Taliban regime made an unprecedented request to retrieve their bodies – a rare admission of Afghan involvement in terrorism inside Pakistan.
Pakistan has also shared credible evidence of 58 terrorist camps, staging posts and safe houses run by TTP and BLA operatives inside Afghanistan with the Kabul regime’s knowledge. NATO weaponry worth $7 billion, left behind during the US withdrawal, has reached these groups significantly enhancing their combat capacity.
Despite these provocations, Pakistan has pursued diplomacy with restraint. Since 2021, it has undertaken four Foreign Minister-level visits, two Defence Minister and DG ISI-led missions, five Special Representative visits and over 225 border flag meetings. Islamabad has issued 836 protest notes and 13 demarches, reflecting sustained goodwill and a commitment to regional stability.
Yet patience has limits. Taliban continue to interpret engagement without accountability as weakness. The international community must now hold Afghan Taliban accountable for promises made in Doha and elsewhere. Humanitarian aid must continue but under strict monitoring to prevent diversion to militants. Recognition and financial relief should be contingent upon verifiable progress, including formation of an inclusive government, dismantling of terrorist networks and restoration of women’s rights.
The choice before the world is clear: enforce Doha commitments or enable another cycle of instability. Taliban’s broken promises are not just Afghanistan’s burden but a regional and global security threat. Holding them accountable is not about isolating Afghanistan but about preserving credibility of international agreements.